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A B S T R A C T
Recent developments in GIS mapping have shown there are signiﬁcant overlaps between mining
concessions and pre-existing forms of land tenure. Yet, there is limited research that analyses the impact
of these overlaps on relevant developmental issues – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In an effort to
remedy this situation, this article pieces together existing research on the sub-Saharan African region to
argue that these overlaps can push pre-existing land users to the margins of land access, which when
combined with the indirect forms of environmental degradation unleashed by overlapping land rights
can spark community-company conﬂict in turn increasing risk for investors. Therefore, greater attention
needs to be paid to exploring the social, economic and environmental transformation of land in the
context of mining concessions, while concessionary contracts need to incorporate an improved
understanding of pre-existing land use patterns through community-led mapping and discussion.
Crown Copyright ã 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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journal homepage: www.else vie r .com/ locat e/e xis1. Introduction: towards an understanding of the geospatial
dynamics of mining concessions
Recent research and developments in geographical information
system (GIS) mapping have provided evidence that there are
signiﬁcant overlaps between mining concessions and pre-existing
land uses in developing countries (Cuba et al., 2014; Oxfam$ Forest Peoples Programme, Free, Prior and Informed Consent 2016. [ONLINE]
Available from: http://www.forestpeoples.org/guiding-principles/free-priorand-
informed-consent-fpic (accessed 20.04.16.).
E-mail address: J.N.mitchell@bath.ac.uk (J. Mitchell).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2016.10.003
2214-790X/Crown Copyright ã 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.America, 2014; Munden Project, 2014; Patel et al., 2016). However,
there remains limited research on the political, economic, social
and geospatial implications of the multifunctional landscapes that
this expansion of mining’s frontier seems to inevitably create.
Therefore, this article provides a critical overview of pre-existing
research regarding the land tenure dynamics of mining con-
cessions in developing countries with a case study of sub-Saharan
Africa. The article explores the impact of overlaying mining
concessions on: pre-existing formal and informal landholding and
access rights to natural resources; current rural development
indicators (such as livelihoods and land’s ﬁnancial utility);
environmental transformation and degradation; and communi-
ty-company conﬂict. The dominant position is that overlaying
2 An exploration concession is an exclusive right to explore for minerals in a
particular land area. A mining license is an exclusive right to extract minerals in a
particular land area.
3
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even if the uses are not formalised by the central government,
represents one of the largest impediments to local developmental
outcomes. Finally, the article assesses critical research gaps and
discusses potential solutions to the negative impacts of over-
lapping mining concessions.
Much of the critical attention on the mining industry in sub-
Saharan Africa is focused on the negative externalities of production,
its macroeconomic dynamics and its often mixed developmental
record (Bush, 2009; Campbell, 2009; Hilson, 2012). Researchers,
however, are becoming more aware of the transformation of land
access dynamics that accompanies the expansion of the industry
(Bebbington and Bury, 2013; Bury, 2005; Cuba et al., 2014; Oxfam
America, 2014; Schueler et al., 2011; Patel et al., 2016; Verbrugge
et al., 2015). Many of these research efforts have drawn upon maps to
visually represent the spatial expansion of the industry, which is
often at odds with pre-existing forms of land use (Cuba et al., 2014;
Oxfam America, 2014; Patel et al., 2016). Of course, maps of mining
concessions are nothing new. Visualisations of mining concessions
represent an integral part of the industry because they represent
spatial land claims to particular mineral rights owned or operated by
particular companies or individuals (Cuba et al., 2014). Indeed, the
historical relationship between land rights and mineral rights is so
entrenched that the geographical boundaries of current nation-
states have been deﬁned by it. Forexample, Zambia’s territory, which
stretches 752.618 square kilometres, marks the border of an old
protectorate administrated by the British South Africa Company for
purposes of mineral exploration (Government of Northern Rhodesia,
1964). Given that property is often conceived of as a ‘bundle of rights’
(Payne et al., 2012, 2015; Payne, 2004), we can see that the land and
naturalresourcesgrantedintheformofaminingconcessionisa form
of property owned or controlled by the leaseholder. Mining
concessions can be granted to a range of different companies for a
variety of different purposes: be it reconnaissance, prospecting,
exploration or extraction.1 In most cases, it bestows upon the bearer
the right to move freely around the concession, to transform the land
– through the act of drilling or prospecting for example – and to
transfer (or sell) the land.
Critical cartography research has taught us that no maps are
apolitical but contain biases and as such are vehicles for often-
unequal power relations, ideas and polemical notions (Weizman,
2002, 2007). Despite the advancements made by Oxfam America
(2014), Cuba et al. (2014) and Patel et al. (2016), much of the
current geospatial information regarding mining concessions is
currently dominated by the neoliberal policy of making the
country as attractive as possible to foreign investment. The only
precise maps that can be found on mining concessions in many
developing countries is either through Spatial Dimension or in the
relevant governmental ministries, usually hidden from the public
or viewed only after paying an expensive fee. Spatial Dimension
have created numerous mining cadastre maps of developing
countries reportedly designed to foster improved stakeholder
relations, reduce corruption and increase transparency. Clearly,
they are not designed for the purposes of resolving disputes over
overlapping claims to land for pre-existing communities. Rather,
they are primarily designed to provide geospatial information to
mining companies, investors and governments to avoid overlaps
with other mining operations and to highlight where there is space1 In this article, a ‘mining concession’ refers to all types of mining concessions
from reconnaissance, exploration and mining (extraction phase) unless speciﬁed.
There remains a considerable research gap exploring the differing land tenure
implications of the separate types of mining concession. Nevertheless, there remain
considerable similarities between the types of concession because they are all types
of exclusive rights to surface land and sub-surface resources.for more mining concessions. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract
important pieces of information from their maps, which reinforce
the wider points of this article. For example, Figs. 1 and 2 (below)
produced by Spatial Dimension, visualises the horizontal distribu-
tion of mining concessions in Zambia and Tanzania respectively.
Both Figs. 1 and 2 show that mining concessions occupy
signiﬁcant tracts of land in Zambia and Tanzania. Nevertheless,
despite being able to visualise the spatial distribution of concessions
in selected developing countries thanks to Spatial Dimension2, the
ﬁrst real use of concession maps as critical tools exists in Oxfam
America (2014) and Cuba et al. (2014) shared research project. They
analysed the spatial overlaps between extractive concessions and
the geography of natural resources key to other actors (in particular
agricultural producers) in Peru and Ghana (Oxfam America, 2014;
Cuba et al., 2014). By using geographic information system (GIS)
maps they found a signiﬁcant relationship – or geospatial overlaps –
between land areas with agricultural potential, water resources,
forest cover and indigenous and Campesino territories (ibid). For
example, Fig. 3 visualises the spatial overlap of mining concessions
and rural agrarian communities in the highlands of Peru, showcas-
ing a signiﬁcant overlaps between the two types of land use.
Clearly, these maps have the potential to highlight the vast
allocation of space for the purposes of mining, which can be used as
evidence to portray mining’s geospatial expansion in many
developing regions. The maps can also visualise overlaps between
concessions and areas of known habitations (for example towns and
rural dwellings) along with overlaps with protected areas including
national parks – allowing for research to highlight the issue of
competing demands for land in many developing countries.
However, despite the radical perspective provided by analysing
these maps, they still only provide a superﬁcial overview of the
true dynamics of mining concessions and issues of land use, tenure
and environmental transformation in selected developing coun-
tries. For example, both the Spatial Dimension and the Oxfam
America maps do not show the multitude of pre-existing uses and
rights to land.3 Although that would be an ambitious project in
itself, it is nonetheless important to use the maps as a starting
point for further exploration into the transformative powers of
mining concessions. Of course, it is the point of the Spatial
Dimension maps not to show pre-existing and competing rights
and claims to land given they largely represent the elitist vision of
space within a territory presented to potential investors to
showcase the viability for investments that occupy horizontal
space. This follows the theme that characterises much of the land-
related investment in sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa,
land, even when occupied by customary tenants, is often presented
as being unused or underutilized and Noe (2013:4) argues that this
‘idle land thesis’ helps “rationalize the transfer of rural landscapes
into new frontiers of investments”.
Additionally, these maps, representative of the ﬂat discourse of
cartography, miss out on the vertical dimensions of sovereignty,
territory and security, and the way in which subsurface minerals
are secured by both surface and sub-surface rights (Weizman,Spatial Dimension is an organisation that, amongst other things, produce
‘ﬂexicadastre maps’, which are digital representations of mineral concessions in
particular countries. They are publicly accessible on the internet (http://www.
spatialdimension.com/Cadastre-Portals) and are funded by a number of bilateral aid
organisations including USAID, the European Union (EU), the Nordic Development
Fund (NDF), the United Nations (UN), AusAid and the World Bank. The countries
that they have produced mining cadastre maps for include the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, South
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. All maps represented in this article have been
referenced appropriately.
Fig. 1. Spatial Dimension map of mining concessions and applications in Zambia.
Yellow denotes exploration concession; Purple denotes mining license; Blue denotes application in progress. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)7
Source: http://portals.ﬂexicadastre.com/zambia/.
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securitisation of the West Bank by the Israeli Defence Force,
explains that we often think of spaces of geography, including
property, as areas not volumes, and as a result we miss the vertical
dimensions of territory that are key to many processes of security,
power and control (Weizman, 2002). This includes vertical
dimensions of territory such as tunnels, high-rise buildings and
airspace. This is relevant to mining because surface rights are
vulnerable to dispossession from below because subsurface rights
also imply a right of access to the surface estate (Bridge, 2013:34), a
point explored in the case study below.
While these maps (and their respective research projects) have
distinct limitations, they nevertheless provide an insight into the
geospatial dynamics of the mining industry in developing
countries. Evidently, mining companies control signiﬁcant por-
tions of land that already has pre-existing uses. The sheer volume
of concessions in many countries mean that there are signiﬁcant
overlaps between concessions and areas of customary tenure. The
scope of this article therefore is to piece together what we already
know about the land tenure dynamics of mining concessions and
where there are future avenues for research. As a consequence, it is
appropriate to turn our attention to the way that sub-Saharan
Africa – a region with extensive large-scale mining and informal
land holding – has experienced the geospatial expansion of the
mining concession model.
2. The impacts of overlapping land rights: a case study of sub-
Saharan Africa
The liberalisation of many post-independent sub-Saharan
African mineral-rich economies during the 1980s, 1990s and
2000s, combined with the privatisation of state-owned mines, led7 The concession has since expired or ceases to exist on mining cadastre maps of
Tanzania.to a dramatic increase of investment into the sub-Saharan African
mining sectors (Bush, 2007). As a result of this increase in
investment, the mining industry has expanded not just in terms of
market capitalisation and production but also in a geospatial sense,
with mining companies being granted increasing amounts of
territory. For example, in Ghana, an estimated 30–40% of gold-
mineralized land is under concession to mining and mineral
exploration companies (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2006; Hilson,
2009). As Figs.1 and 2 show, many sub-Saharan African states, keen
to promote the extraction of their often-extensive mineral deposits
are granting concessions to a range of different companies on land
that is occupied and indeed used in forms of agriculture,
pastoralism, small-scale mining, ecosystem conservation and
shelter.
2.1. Contested law and custom: insecurity of tenure and erosion of
rights to access natural resources
The enveloping of pre-existing land uses in the horizontal
expansion of mining concessions in sub-Saharan Africa represents
age-old processes of systematic land dispossession. In terms of law,
there are three ways sub-Saharan African governments can justify
the overlaying of rights to land in the form of mining concessions.
First, land in many sub-Saharan African countries is organised into
split estates whereby surface and sub-surface property rights are
divided (Bridge, 2013:34). For Bridge (2013:34), using the role of
volume as an analytical tool has highlighted that subsurface rights
imply a right of access to the surface estate and as such this makes
it easier to circumnavigate pre-existing surface claims in order to
provide an attractive environment for investment in subsurface
resources (with implied surface rights). Second, many sub-Saharan
African states retain all ownership rights to land and any form of
occupation are merely on lease from the government. In Tanzania
for example, it is understood by some that land is only owned (or
leased) to a depth of one metre (Mitchell, 2013). This ultimately
Fig. 2. Spatial Dimension map of mining concessions and applications in Tanzania.
Yellow denotes exploration concession; Purple denotes mining license; Blue denotes application in progress. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Source: http://portal.mem.go.tz/map/.
Fig. 3. Spatial Overlap of Mining Concessions and Rural Agrarian Communities in Peru.
Source: Oxfam America (2014:19).
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claims) from landholders (Bridge, 2013). Third, the overlaying of
mining concessions on land with pre-existing claims to it is – to a
signiﬁcant extent – a symptom of the wider issue of the systematic
marginalisation of customary tenure4 in sub-Saharan Africa
(Peters, 2013). In many sub-Saharan African countries, 80–90%4 Although Fig. 4 shows overlaps between agricultural land cover and
concessions in Ghana.of land is held by customary tenure, a considerable portion of
which is being overlapped or dispossessed by private tenure
arrangements, including mining (Manji, 2006). Customary tenure
in specialised ‘native reserves’ was a colonial construct designed to
systematically diminish local land rights and make it easier to
dispossess indigenous people if they were on land deemed
economically attractive (Chanock, 1991; Peters, 2013).
Of course, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, the picture of
landholding and dispossession is not simply black or white.
J. Mitchell / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 1117–1129 1121Property, seen as a ‘bundle of rights’ (Payne et al., 2015), is just one
part of a wider picture of access to and control over resources
(Peluso and Lund, 2011; Sikor and Lund, 2009). Meinzen-Dick and
Mwangi (2009: 36) argue that property rights can be thought of as
a ‘web of interests’, “with many different parties having a right to
use, regulate, or manage the resource, which may be based on a
range of customary institutions or local norms as well as state law.”
The formalization, or perhaps more accurately, the privatisation of
land rights – especially large-scale agricultural or mining invest-
ments – has, according to Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi (ibid)
“historically led to a cutting of this web, creating more exclusive
forms of rights over resources.” By securing exclusive rights to land
and resources supported by the state with its monopoly on the
means of coercion, a mining concession could cut this web and
transform the political economy of an area. Ostensibly these
include rights to own, to transform and to transfer land, yet the
governance of mining companies in sub-Saharan Africa remains in
a ‘grey’ state, whereby it can be unclear what rights mining
companies actually have (or, perhaps more crucially, don’t have) in
relation to pre-existing land owners and users. For example, in
Zambia, those who are granted a mining or exploration concession
are granted the capacity to do “other acts and things as are
necessary for or reasonably incidental to the carrying on of those
operations” (Govt. of Zambia, 2008). Quite where this apparently
government-endorsed impunity on mining concession land and
beyond ends is both legally and morally obscure.
Given that mining in developing countries often operates ‘at the
margins’ of governmental control, where state power or legitimacy
is contested (in part owing to the dualistic land tenure system of
sub-Saharan African states), the imposition of a powerful and well
capitalised entity in the form of a mining company can severely
challenge the legitimacy of pre-existing land tenure institutions
(Fisher, 2007; Bury, 2005). In Peru, Bury (2005) ﬁnds that the
expansion of the transnational mining sector is transforming the
role of land tenure institutions from being communally managed
(or informally negotiated) to being privately owned, primarily
because the mining companies are assuming the role of chief land
administrator (including the allocation of titles). The mining
companies have assumed this responsibility partly because of the
retrenchment of the state during neoliberal restructuring but also
partly, it is assumed, because it is in their interests to control
proximate land tenure systems (Bury, 2005). As a result of such
practices, pre-existing patterns of ownership and control can be
effectively pushed to the margins by large-scale mining projects
(Fisher, 2007). This can lead to the transparent physical displace-
ment of people from land, but more subtly, it can transform the
way in which people perceive authority over land. For example,
Verbrugge et al. (2015:50) ﬁnd that even in areas of weak state
presence in the Philippines, the DRC and Liberia, “people make
constant reference to state-sanctioned legality to underpin their
(often overlapping) claims to mineral resource wealth”, even
though the ability to beneﬁt from state-sanctioned legality hinges
on access to “vital ﬁnancial and political resources”. The overlaying
of mining concessions can also lead to a transformation in the
capacity to access natural resources and land; what Bridge
(2002:382) calls a “shufﬂing in the sociospatial rights to use
land”. All of these situations can have signiﬁcant implications for
issues pertaining to rural development, including tenure security
and livelihood generation.
Even in the early stages of a mining project, where junior
companies or individual prospectors are exploring for natural
resource deposits, the pre-existing land user’s sense of the future
can be altered forever (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). Pre-existing or
proximate communities, whose ﬁrst understanding that there will
be a new mining project near them can come in the form of
witnessing exploration teams drilling in nearby ﬁelds, are likely tobe unsure of whether a new mining project spells ecological and
livelihood destruction and dispossession – what Bebbington and
Bury (2013) call ‘geographies of insecurity’ – or presents
opportunities in the form of employment, land booms, and
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives – what Bebbington
and Bury (2013) call ‘geographies of opportunity’ (Bebbington and
Bury, 2013). This is often due to the lack of transparency or
accessibility to information in terms of land use and displacement
for local communities incorporated into many mining deals, where
information is often held in central capital cities or in online
resources.
Cuba et al. (2014) and Oxfam America (2014) argue that the
granting of an exploration concession is at the very least a tacit
approval that a mining licence will be granted within that land
area. If the extraction point is within the vicinity of permanent or
semi-permanent habitation, or indeed, pre-existing land uses such
as agriculture or pastoralist grazing routes, the granting of a mining
licence will most likely necessitate the displacement of people
and/or livelihoods (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). Development-
induced displacement has a relatively extensive history in sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly concerning the mining industry. For
example, in a well-known case, it was reported that 30,000 people
were displaced in Tarkwa, Ghana between 1990 and 1998 to make
way for large-scale mining activities (Hilson, 2002). In many cases,
this displacement does not necessarily result in adequate
resettlement and remuneration. For example, in Solwezi, Zambia,
800 people were evicted to make way for the Kansanshi mine,
which covers 24,864.655 ha (see Fig. 4). The displaced were
resettled nearby but still within the mining concession and were
not granted any assured legal rights to the land they were on (Hall,
2015). As the mine expanded, the villagers were displaced three
more times (ibid). This example shows that it is important to
explore how displaced communities reconﬁgure new patterns of
land control and access to natural resources, particularly if
‘resettled’ into the land of the concession.
Where there is uncertainty over land control like in the example
of the Kansanshi mine, and where mining companies compete for
resources or land with local communities, a mining concession can
be seen as a kind of buffer zone, where access and control over
resources can often be contested. This buffer zone area necessitates
the sharing of physical resources, chieﬂy water, land, and
infrastructure (Bebbington and Bury, 2013; Hinojosa and Bebbing-
ton, 2007). Although this is not to say that localised politics of land
access were uniformly harmonious preceding the overlaying of
mining concessions  in many cases customary tenure systems
might be characterised by pre-existing localised processes of
dispossession and accumulation. Nevertheless, while there are
examples where land relations between mining companies and
pre-existing land users are negotiated rather than conﬂictual or
contested (Aubynn, 2009), there are many examples where mining
concessions erode communal rights to access natural resources, in
turn fostering livelihood dispossession for local communities
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Bury, 2002, 2004; Geenen, 2014; Hilson,
2014; Hinojosa, 2013; Kitula, 2006; Maconachie, 2014, 2011;
Perreault, 2013). Geenen (2014) ﬁnds that a government-backed
multinational mining operation (Twangiza mine, operated by the
Canadian Banro Corporation) has fostered processes of displace-
ment and dispossession for pre-existing small-scale miners in
concessions in South Kivu, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
(see Fig. 5). This was despite the observation that large-scale
industrial mining ventures do not typically compete for the same
deposits as small-scale miners (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2006).
Furthermore, the increasing allocation of land to large-scale
foreign investors for the purposes of mining, ranching and biofuels
in Northern Tanzania has reportedly pushed pastoralists and
Fig. 4. Kansanshi Mining PLC’s mining and exploration concession in Zambia.
Source: http://portals.ﬂexicadastre.com/zambia/.
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between the two groups (Al Jazeera, 2014).
Nevertheless, Aubynn (2009) presents the case of a negotiated
relationship between a large-scale mining company and small-
scale miners on the Abosso Goldﬁeld concession in Ghana. Hilson
(2009) had previously observed that the Ghanaian Government
has largely been unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade mining
companies to release sections of demarcated concessions. In 2008
it managed to demarcate 500,000 acres for the purpose of small-
scale mining ‘concessions’ but their viability as a solution has yet to
be properly researched (Hilson, 2009). In the case of the Abosso
concession, the mining company opened up space for 740 small-
scale miners to operate on in a bid to reduce trespassing onto the
main mine site. Despite ostensible altruistic motives, the
company’s ultimate aim was to reduce and remove small-scaleFig. 5. Twangiza large-scale mineral exploitation concessions in South Kivu, DRC.
Blue denotes mineral exploitation concession; Grey boxes denote areas where artisanal
colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Source: http://portals.ﬂexicadastre.com/drc/en/.miners from their mining lease (Aubynn, 2009). Aubynn (2009)
argues that once the global price of minerals is economically
attractive enough, large-scale operators will dispossess small-scale
miners from the marginal lands of the concession. Even in a
situation when large-scale mining companies tolerate small-scale
miners (and for that matter, farmers, hunters and herders)
operating on their concessions, the latter still have no legally
enforceable rights to be there and can be evicted at any time. If this
is to taken seriously as a policy measure, both the mining company
and the state must grant small-scale miners operating on the
concession security of tenure.
In the contested space of the mining or exploration concession,
where informal and formal ownership rights are overlapped and,
in many cases, disregarded: it can leave pre-existing landholders
with insecure land tenure. Security of land tenure is a concept and small-scale mining (ASM) is tolerated. (For interpretation of the references to
5 Customary tenure refers to informal systems of land organisation used to
express and order ownership, possession, and access, regulate use and transfer, and
is based on custom as opposed to law (FAO, 2002).
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land-claimant is protected from forced or arbitrary evictions
(Payne et al., 2015). Given the direct, indirect and repeated
examples of displacement conducted on mining concessions, it is
clear that many who live and work on the land of mining
concessions have limited protection from forced eviction. For
mainstream developmental agencies, security of tenure is thought
to be central to the process of poverty alleviation, economic
development and social equity, and the absence of it can produce
extreme vulnerability and poverty for individuals and social
groups (e.g. IFAD, 2006; USAID, 2009; World Bank, 2016).
From this, we can see that the overlaying of rights to land in the
form of a mining concession is a continuation of inequitable land
policies in sub-Saharan Africa, and that it can push pre-existing
land users to the margins of land access. As the mining concession
can challenge pre-existing structures of land control and owner-
ship, it therefore can have an effect upon key concepts of rural
development, in particular the livelihoods of rural people and the
role of land within rural economic development – an outcome
explored in the next section.
2.2. The mining concession and rural development
The expansion of the mining industry predominately occurs in
the rural hinterland of sub-Saharan Africa, where the natural
resources inherent in land (soils, minerals, trees etc.) reportedly
provide many with their main source of subsistence, employment
and livelihoods, and therefore given the need to invest in the land
(in terms of labour, capital and resources) the issue of security of
tenure becomes crucial (Hall, 2013). For example, it is estimated
that 63% of sub-Saharan Africans live in rural areas and 62% of
Africans are engaged in agriculture as their main form of
employment, 80% of which are smallholders (Livingstone et al.,
2011).
Yet this assumed relationship between land, subsistence and
livelihoods, central to many rural development debates, has begun
to be challenged in some quarters. Rigg (2006) argues that land and
livelihoods are becoming increasingly divorced from farming (and
therefore the land) in the rural South, with patterns of wealth and
poverty becoming more diverse, diffuse and delocalised. However,
much, if not all, of Rigg (2006) data is drawn from South East Asia.
In the sub-Saharan African context, Oya et al. (2008) report the
importance of rural labour markets in Mozambique, an expression
of the decoupling of landholding as imperative for rural employ-
ment. Any argument concerning the extent landholding is a
prerequisite for rural employment must take into account the
complex societal dynamics of landholding in agrarian sub-Saharan
African communities, particularly concerning issues of gender
(Wanyeki, 2003; Berry, 1993). Indeed, any percentage ﬁgure, claim
or map might skim over the uneven way in which women hold or
access land in many sub-Saharan African countries, where access is
largely determined by relations with men (Wanyeki, 2003).
Nevertheless, according to statistics and ﬁeldwork, many (possibly
the majority of) rural sub-Saharan Africans still depend upon
access to land and communal natural resources for subsistence,
employment, livelihoods and social status (Cotula, 2007; Shackle-
ton et al., 2001; Geenen, 2014). Therefore, the way in which mining
concessions intersect with, or contest processes of livelihoods and
landholding (including associated dynamics of gender) will
continue to be an important area of future research, even if
landholding is not the predominant mode of subsistence and
employment in rural sub-Saharan Africa.
Fortunately, the impact of large-scale mining on local live-
lihoods speciﬁcally has received a number of research efforts (e.g.
Bebbington et al., 2008; Hinojosa, 2013; Maconachie, 2011, 2014;
Perreault, 2013), with some efforts at least implicitly focusing onthe relationship between land and livelihoods (e.g. Kitula, 2006;
Bury, 2002, 2005; Geenen, 2014). Given the heterogeneity of the
research communities the results are predictably varied. In Peru,
Hinojosa (2013) ﬁnds that the large-scale mining operations can
produce economic beneﬁts for younger generations but produces
vulnerabilities for older generations. In Geita, Tanzania, a region
dominated by intersections of large-scale mining (LSM) and
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), Kitula (2006) has argued
that ‘mining’ had a negative effect on agro-pastoralists while the
majority of respondents reported that they beneﬁtted economi-
cally from mining activites. However, Kitula (2006) fails to
disaggreate between ‘small’ and ‘large’ scale mining, meaning it
is difﬁcult to understand whether the respondents are discussing
beneﬁtting from ASM, in line with current research (Hilson, 2012),
or from the large-scale enclaved Geita gold mine. Ultimately, much
of the literature portrays accounts of local livelihood fragmenta-
tion or dispossession in the wake of a new large-scale mining
project particualrly in areas dependent upon communal access to
land and natural resources, contrasting the rhetoric of trickle-
down economics that accompanies much of the development-
speak of mining projects (Bebbington et al., 2008; Hinojosa, 2013;
Maconachie, 2011, 2014; Perreault, 2013; Geenen, 2014). However,
research exploring the differential between ‘geographies of
opportunity’ and ‘geographies of insecurity’ in mining regions in
sub-Saharan Africa would add further evidence to the debate.
The structure of the mining industry also has a signiﬁcant
bearing on developmental outcomes. Distinct phases of explora-
tion and exploitation (mining) mean that exploration permits tend
to be leased by ‘junior’ mining companies, with the purview to ﬁnd
viable deposits that be can be extracted and sell the concession on
to larger mining companies who have the capital and technology to
exploit the minerals (Dougherty, 2013). The maps of Zambia and
Tanzania (Figs. 1 and 2) show that exploration permits are the most
common form of mining concession. For Dougherty (2013), the
increase in small ‘junior’ mining ﬁrms that specialise in
prospecting and exploration concessions has “diminished devel-
opment outcomes and increased contestation by host community
residents and their transnational allies at mining sites around the
world” (p.342). The ﬁnancial pressures on junior mining compa-
nies (most of them do not have signiﬁcant reserves of capital like
‘major’ mining companies) and the relatively short timeframe of
exploration contracts and the limited need to maintain good
relations with proximate or pre-existing communities (as they will
sell on the lease to another ﬁrm), combined with the general lack of
governmental regulation can lead to unduly aggressive and
exploitative measures (e.g. Mitchell, 2013).
The mining concession model can also transform the role of
land as an asset and commodity, challenging mainstream thinking
about land’s role within rural development – although this is an
under-researched topic. Unleashing the value of land (in terms of
transfer value, rent, and access to credit) by securing rights to land
through land titling or formalization measures is a fundamental
practice of many rural development initiatives. Particularly in the
context of customary tenure systems, the effective privatisation of
land in the form of mining or exploration concessions may cause
pre-existing land users to struggle to utilise or beneﬁt from the
ﬁnancial utility of land – in terms of collateral, rent, transfer or
subsequent land booms – within wider political and economic
systems (Bury, 2005; Bebbington and Bury, 2013).5 In terms of
collateral for example, in Tanzania, banks do not lend money on
anything other than titled land, registered under the Land
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the population (Mcauslan, 2005). In this situation it is unlikely that
citizens can apply for a land title when the land in question is under
concession and open to be transformed by the mining company.
This type of insecurity is important given that a signiﬁcant portion
of Tanzania’s total land area is under concession (see Fig. 2) and
that access to small loans or microcredit based on secure parcels of
land is often put forward as one of the key elements of reducing
poverty by mainstream development agencies (USAID, 2011a,b).
However, the conclusion that a mining concession might limit
access to the ﬁnancial utility of land for some actors is not a ringing
endorsement for de Soto-inspired land law reform, which has had
mixed, if not negative, developmental results in sub-Saharan Africa
in particular (Payne et al., 2015). De Soto (2000) argued that private
property is the pre-requisite to economic development as any
obscurity of ownership decreases the worth of the asset, which
inspired a wave of formalisation and land titling projects designed
to protect previously insecure land holders whilst stimulating
investment (Hall, 2013; Byamugisha, 1999). Nevertheless, land
titling programmes have been heavily criticised for a number of
outcomes including failing to appreciate the speciﬁc gender
dynamics of sub-Saharan African communities, leading to an
entrenchment of gender inequality over land (Varley, 2007;
Bayisenge et al., 2015). It also has reportedly opened up space to
initiate new grabs for land, as powerful actors claim as much as
possible prior to state/donor surveying of land (Hall, 2013:122),
and has been criticised for being prohibitively expensive and
excessively bureaucratic (Stanﬁeld and Bloch, 2002:3; Augustinus
and Benschop, 2003). Manji (2006) argues that the reformation of
land law in post-independence Africa, with the formalization of
land into modern individualised property plots, is predominately a
technical exercise designed to encourage the transformation of
land into a globalised commodity (Hopwood, 2015). In an analysis
of land reform in Uganda and Tanzania in the 1990s, Manji (2006)
argues that the formalization of land protected international
investments but marginalised rural people. Moreover, Manji
(2006) counters De Soto (2000) claim that unregistered land isFig. 6. Spatial overlap of mineral concessions and agricultural land cover in Ghana (20
Source: Oxfam America (2014).a ‘dead asset’ by arguing that there are many reasons why peasant
farmers might prefer informal tenure systems – for example to
avoid paying tax (Manji, 2006; Federici, 2008).
Clearly, overlaying mining concessions on top of pre-existing
land uses challenges prevailing notions of rural development,
including rural livelihoods and the ﬁnancial role of land. This, when
combined with the environmental change that accompanies the
development of large-scale mining concessions as the next section
will detail, transform the local context to such an extent to foster
community-company conﬂict.
2.3. Environmental change and degradation
That the large-scale mining industry can directly transform,
pollute and damage the surrounding environment through drilling,
extraction, waste material formation, and water contamination, is
relatively well accepted (Kirsch, 2014). But a LSM project also
indirectly sets in a chain of events that further transforms and
damages the environment, altering landscapes on a wider level
than previously thought.
As pre-existing land uses and rural inhabitants are increasingly
being pushed to the margins of land access and control, they can
increasingly turn to enviromentally damaging activities to sustain
their livelihoods (Bury, 2005). The displacement of farmers to
make way for mining projects often perpetuates a cycle of poverty
and environmental degradation as these former farmers are forced
to turn their hand to artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)
(Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Maconachie, 2011). Given the
predominance of agriculture as a mode of employment and
subsistence in sub-Saharan Africa, it is not surprising to see a
signiﬁcant relationship between large-scale mining (LSM) con-
cessions and agricultural land use cover in sub-Saharan Africa. For
example, Fig. 6 visualises a signiﬁcant relationship between LSM
concessions and agricultural land cover in Ghana between 2005
and 2006 (Oxfam America, 2014). The close relationship between
farming and ASM in sub-Saharan Africa (Maconachie and Binns,
2007; Hilson, 2016), created in part by the overlap between mining05–2006).
Fig. 7. Deforestation of the Mwekera Forest Reserve in Kitwe.
Source: http://www.africaein.net/zm/en/issues/view.
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small-scale farmers as expressed in Fig. 6 creates a wider expanse
of unsustainable extractive practices, generating more pollution
and converting a wider expanse of often fertile land into
landscapes of extraction, all of which can increase the dependence
on ASM as a livelihood (Slack, 2013).
Simarlarly, in the Andean region of Peru (see Fig. 2), Bury (2005)
found that the spatial redistribution of land-use activities
following the allocation of mining concessions and subsequent
‘land booms’ has forced many households to change their land-use
activities, often shifting livelihood activities dependent upon land
to alternative areas. This overburdening of natural resources has
led to decreased soil fertility (ibid). Furthermore, in the sub-
Saharan African context, Schueler et al. (2011) found that surface
mining in Ghana hastened deforestation and substantial losses in
farmland within the parameter of the often vast mining
concessions, suggesting the environmental costs of Ghana’s gold
boom might be much higher than previously thought. Similarly, in
Zambia, the demand for timber and charcoal in the mines has
resulted in deforestation in the Forestry reserves adjacent to the
Copperbelt (Hansungule et al., 1998:38). Once the trees had been
felled, squatters took to farming the land, furthering the dramatic
transformation of the landscape (ibid). Fig. 7 visualises an example
of this type of environmental transformation in the case of the
deforestation of the Mwekera Forest Reserve, adjacent to the mines
of Kitwe in the Copperbelt, from 1984 to 2011. Following the theme
of shifting marginalized livelihoods to more environmentally
damaging livelihoods, Shitima (2005) argues that the privatization
of the mines in Kitwe has undermined local people’s livelihoods
making the allegedly ‘vacant’ Mwekera an attractive option for
settlement and charcoal production.
Additionally, in the Singida region of Tanzania, near the capital
Dodoma, a process of what Perreault (2013) calls ‘dispossession by
accumulation’ is occurring. ‘Dispossession by accumulation’ is an
adaptation of Harvey’s (2003) accumulation by dispossession (the
process whereby communal natural resources or public assets are
forcibly dispossessed to make way for capital accumulation),
where proximate communities are dispossessed of their land or
livelihoods by being forced to accumulate the negative external-
ities of large-scale production (namely, pollution). In Bahi, in the
Singida region of Tanzania, it has been reported that farmers have
reported ﬁnding uranium exploration companies drilling bore-
holes in their ﬁelds, which subsequently contaminated their crops
and left them with severe burns and health complications
(Mitchell, 2013). The uranium exploration company in this case
(Uranex Tanzania Limited) had been granted an exploration
concession of 275.79 square kilometres6 and thus had a legal
right to transform the land – although it was quite clearly in
violation of the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).
The villagers’ subsequent protests were met with a violent reaction
by the local police force (ibid). The farmers were forced to
accumulate the toxic externalities of exploration and suffered the
consequences, as they could not work through illness and their
crop failed (Mitchell, 2013).
Thus, the examples in this section highlight a signiﬁcant
relationship between the practice of allocating mining concessions
and environmental degradation through the indirect transforma-
tion of local livelihoods and the direct externalization of pollutants
on pre-existing agricultural land usage.6 Much of the ‘value’ of land in the context of the mining-ﬁnancial industry nexus
is speculative. Exploration concessions, for example, depend upon the locating of
viable deposits (dependent upon wider global economic trends in terms of the price
of minerals on the global market) often after considerable capital investment.2.4. Conﬂict
Tenure and livelihood insecurity in a context of environmental
degradation and economic transformation has fuelled conﬂict
between proximate communities and large-scale mining compa-
nies and exploration companies. The incidences of community-
company conﬂict have risen sharply in recent years, largely
1126 J. Mitchell / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 1117–1129concomitant to the overall increase in the extraction of natural
resources worldwide. The prevalence of conﬂict between pre-
existing land users and LSM is indicative of the insecurity
generated by the haphazard granting of mining concessions
(Hilson, 2002) and also the unequal distribution of state-
sanctioned rights granted to access mineral resources (Verbrugge
et al., 2015). Indeed, displacement, insecurity, overlapping and
contested claims to land and environmental degradation explain –
in part – the rise in community-LSM conﬂict (Bebbington, 2012;
Kirsch, 2014).
One of the main forms of community-company conﬂict is
between LSM and ASM (Bebbington, 2012). Much of this conﬂict is
predicated upon close proximity between the two actors – as for
example, Patel et al. (2016) found that in Ghana, 52% of the
identiﬁed small-scale mining activity occurs within the boundaries
of large-scale concessions. Fig. 8 showcases the signiﬁcant overlap
between unofﬁcial small-scale mining sites and large-scale mining
concessions in the mining regions of Ghana. Such close proximity
between large-scale and small-scale mining fuels competition for
land and resources between large and small-scale miners, which
can often spill into violent conﬂict – involving protests, forced
evictions, heavy handed security guards and mass vandalism
(Bebbington, 2012). Although some see this conﬂict between large-
scale and small-scale miners as hinging on concerns of demands
for opportunities (Bebbington and Bury, 2013:259-260), it is
important to understand that small-scale miners are not merely
opportunistic actors, looking to ‘get rich quick’, but rather, ASM is
largely driven by poverty and protests are often symbolic albeit
often violent acts against the displacement, environmental
degradation and perceived injustice of heavy-handed securityFig. 8. Map of small-scale mining activity in large-scale mining concessions in mining
Source: Patel et al. (2016).guards that has accompanied the mine in question (Hilson, 2009).
Moreover, ASM is a complex sector, driven by a multitude of factors
(Maconachie, 2011). As mentioned previously, farmers dispos-
sessed of their land and livelihoods to make way for large-scale
mines are often forced to turn to ASM for a livelihood (ibid). It has
also been argued that ASM supports subsistence farming
economically throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Hilson, 2016), and
in Sierra Leone, small-scale mining can support the education of
youths (Maconachie and Hilson, 2016).
Rather, conﬂict over access to minerals and land is often
predicated upon contested claims to land, with small-scale miners
emphasizing they have the traditional right to access and work the
land based on historical precedence and customary tenure (Hilson,
2002; Bush, 2009; Patel et al., 2016; Aubynn, 2009). Contrastingly,
private mining companies emphasize their ‘legal’ private right to
the land, with Western constructs of permits and concessions (
Lange, 2008; Aubynn, 2009). Here we see largely opposed political
economies of land access and control fostering confusion,
resentment, insecurity and ultimately conﬂict (Sikor and Lund,
2009). Indeed, Kulindwa et al. (2003:91–92) argue that the root
causes of mining conﬂicts in Tanzania is the misconception among
local people over land rights, ownership and legal rights over
mining in combination with a lack of planning and co-ordination at
the national level (Lange, 2008). That the ASM sector is
characterised by informality is partly indicative of the unequal
distribution of distribution of state-sanctioned rights granted to
access mineral resources (Verbrugge et al., 2015). However, despite
the often-contested relations between LSM and ASM it has been
found that, globally, ASM often share negotiated and mutually
beneﬁcial relations with surface landowners (Verbrugge et al., region of Ghana.
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access and development is an important area for future research
efforts.
Notwithstanding the impacts on the pre-existing communities,
allocating concessions on land that is previously occupied
exacerbates risk for the concession holder. Pre-existing land users
and inhabitants use both legal and extra-legal mechanisms to
resist the imposition of a concession. In the mining industry for
example, it has been estimated that a project with a capital
expenditure of between US$3-5 billion will suffer costs of around
US$20 million per week of delayed production due to conﬂict
(Davis and Franks, 2014:8).
3. Conclusions, future directions and recommended strategies
This article has drawn parallels between the overlaying of
mining concessions and incidences of insecurity, conﬂict, environ-
mental transformation and investment risk that often blight
mining communities in sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of rural
development, mining concessions are effectively pulling the rug
out from under from many rural sub-Saharan Africans – by – in the
most part – undermining their tenure status, unleashing increased
competition for resources, and degrading wide expanses of
environment. While GIS maps highlight the extent of overlaps
within the mining industry, particularly in areas dominated by
customary tenure in sub-Saharan Africa, their analytical utility
does not necessarily extend any further than that, unless they are
re-designed to incorporate pre-existing legitimate land uses.
Key areas for future linked research include understanding how
the government (and associates including donors) rationalise and
legitimise the systematic overlaying of mining concessions.
Moreover, it is important to continue research on how the mining
concession affects local livelihood patterns, issue of land tenure
security and the (often unequal) gender dynamics of land access
along with understanding how the overlaying of mining con-
cessions affect the capacity of pre-existing land uses to draw upon
land’s ﬁnancial utility (collateral for example). Following insightful
work by Geenen (2014) for example, there is a pressing need to
explore this transformation in the context of ASM in sub-Saharan
Africa. It is also important to consider the differences and
approaches in different types of concession to be able to liaise
with the relevant type of mining company (exploration or mining).
Furthermore, an understanding of the environmental impacts,
both direct and indirect, of concession granting could be expanded
further to appreciate how land-use related environmental
transformation occurs from exploration phases to exploitation
and reclamation in the proximate landscape.
In terms of solutions, in the context of land-use conﬂicts in the
mining industry Hilson (2002) argues that as mines and
communities compete for limited plots of land it is unlikely that
a strategy can be devised so all parties are provided with a
maximum beneﬁt. The question however, need not be how can
every actor can receive maximum beneﬁt but rather, how can we
encourage mining companies (and governments) to respect
legitimate pre-existing land uses and tenure? Many of the
problems associated with the mining concession model in sub-
Saharan Africa are attributable to the lack of understanding or
awareness that any given concession is a multifunctional
landscape with a multitude of pre-existing rights to land. In the
context of conﬂicting relations between large and small-scale
miners in the DRC, Geenen (2014) argues that to truly understand
the land tenure dynamics of mining concessions and the policy
solutions required, it is important to understand ﬁrst how small-
scale miners perceive notions of property and legitimacy,
particularly in relation to questions of livelihoods and (more
tenuously) development. The same can be said for how miningcompanies perceive notions of pre-existing land tenure patterns,
and how they can be encouraged to respect legitimate pre-existing
uses of land. Legitimacy need not be fully consistent with statutory
law, but represent a form of on-going social acceptance (Payne
et al., 2015:6; FAO, 2009).
Like many land tenure issues in sub-Saharan Africa, the
challenge is how do you recognise pre-existing rights to land
when they are often informal without in turn transforming
customary land into a global commodity? Whilst the project is
enmeshed in the dogma of land tenure formalization that Manji
(2006) warned against, USAID’s Mobile Application for Secure
Tenure (MAST) project provides an insight into how mining
companies can be provided with information to respect pre-
existing rights to land. The project provided training, support and
technology for Tanzanian landholders to map their (World Bank-
promoted) Certiﬁcates of Customary Rights of Occupancy (CCROs)
using mobile technology (USAID, 2016). USAID (2016:23) argue
that the beneﬁts are multitudinous, including gender empower-
ment, increased perceived tenure security and potential to use land
as collateral for loans. Using mobile technology and surveys to map
pre-existing land uses could be an efﬁcient and participatory way
to identify pre-existing uses and ownership rights to land and
analyse their legitimacy.
However, providing mining companies with information on
pre-existing land tenure patterns does not necessarily mean they
will respect them. Governments need to regulate the behaviour of
mining companies, ensuring they do not ‘step over the line’ with
regard to legitimate pre-existing rights to land. This is perhaps the
main challenge facing actors concerned with the deleterious land
impact of mining concessions in sub-Saharan Africa. Practically-
speaking however, pre-existing rights to land could be established,
mapped and documented and entwined as part of the mining
concession contract, where mining companies must respect pre-
existing rights and not partake in activities that would challenge or
disrupt them. For this, there is no silver bullet. Transforming
mining concessions into multifunctional landscapes would still
create or expand localised processes of contestation, conﬂict and
competition over land within societies. But it might go some way to
mitigate the problems explained in this article.
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Bayisenge, J., Höjer, S., Espling, M., 2015. Women’s land rights in the context of the
land tenure reform in Rwanda – the experiences of policy implementers. J. East.
Afr. Stud. 9 (January (1)), 74–90.
Bebbington, A., Bury, J., 2013. Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil,
and Gas in Latin America. University of Texas Press.
Bebbington, A., Bebbington, D. Humphreys, Bury, J., Lingan, J., Muñoz, J.P., Scurrah,
M., 2008. Mining and social movements: struggles over livelihood and rural
territorial development in the andes. World Dev. 36, 2888–2905. doi:http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.11.016.
1128 J. Mitchell / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 1117–1129Bebbington, A., 2012. Social Conﬂict, Economic Development and Extractive
Industry: Evidence from South America (Hardback). Routledge.
Berry, S., 1993. No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change
in Sub-Saharan Africa Madison. University of Wisconsin Press, WI.
Bridge, G., 2002. Grounding globalization: the prospects of perils of linking
economic processes of globalization to environmental outcomes. Econ. Geogr.
78, 361–386. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4140814.
Bridge, G., 2013. Territory, now in 3D!. Polit. Geogr. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
polgeo.2013.01.005.
Bury, J.T., 2002. Livelihoods, mining and peasant protests in the peruvian andes. J.
Lat. Am. Geogr. 1 (1) doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lag.2007.0018.
Bury, J., 2004. Livelihoods in transition: transnational gold mining operations and
local change in Cajamarca, Peru. Geogr. J. 170, 78–91. doi:http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j. 0016-7398.2004.05042.x.
Bury, J., 2005. Mining mountains: neoliberalism, land tenure, livelihoods, and the
new Peruvian mining industry in Cajamarca. Environ. Plan. A 37, 221–239. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/a371.
Bush, R., 2007. Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the
Global South. Pluto Press, London.
Bush, R., 2009. Soon there will be no-one left to take the corpses to the morgue:
accumulation and abjection in Ghana’s mining communities. Resour. Policy 34,
57–63. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.02.002.
Byamugisha, F.F.K., 1999. The Effects of Land Registration on Financial Development
and Economic Growth: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework. Washington
DC.
Campbell, B., 2009. Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development. Pluto Press.
Chanock, M., 1991. Paradigms, policies and property: a review of the customary law
of land tenure. In: Mann, Kristin, Roberts, Richard (Eds.), Law in Colonial Africa
(Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH, 1991), , pp. 61–84 p. 62.
Cotula, L., 2007. Legal Empowerment for Local Resource Control, BIOS. .
Cuba, N., Bebbington, A., Rogan, J., Millones, M., 2014. Extractive industries,
livelihoods and natural resource competition: mapping overlapping claims in
Peru and Ghana. Appl. Geogr. 54, 235–236. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
apgeog.2014.05.003.
Davis, R., Franks, D., 2014. Costs of company-community conﬂict in the extractive
sector. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 66. Harvard
Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA.
De Soto, H., 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and
Fails Everywhere Else. Basic Books.
Dougherty, M.L., 2013. The Global Gold Mining Industry: Materiality, Rent-seeking,
Junior Firms and Canadian Corporate Citizenship. vol. 17 (4), pp. 339–354
10.1179/1024529413Z.00000000042.
Elden, S., 2013. Secure the volume: vertical geopolitics and the depth of power. Polit.
Geogr. 34, 35–51 May 2013.
FAO, 2002. What Is Land Tenure? [ONLINE] Available from: http://www.fao.org/
docrep/005/y4307e/y4307e05.htm.
FAO, 2009. Land Tenure Working Paper 11: Palmer, Fricska and Wehrmann, Towards
Improved Land Governance. .
Federici, S., 2008. The politics of land reform in Africa: from communal tenure to
free markets. In: Manji, A. (Ed.), African Studies Review, vol. 51. , pp. 1.
Fisher, E., 2007. Occupying the margins: labour integration and social exclusion in
artisanal mining in Tanzania. Dev. Change 38 (4), 735–760.
Geenen, S., 2014. Dispossession, displacement and resistance: artisanal miners in a
gold concession in South-Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo. Resour. Policy 41,
90–99. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2013.03.004.
Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2006. Ghana Chamber of Mines Factoid 2006 (Ghana
Chamber of Mines, Accra. . http://ghanachamberofmines.org/internet/index.
php>.
Government of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), 1964. White Paper on British South
Africa Company’s Claims to Mineral Royalties, 1138. pp. 1135.
Government of Zambia, 2008. The Mines and Minerals Development Act. , pp. 2008
Lusaka.
Hall, D., 2013. Land. John Wiley & Sons.
Hall, R., 2015. Strengthening Land Rights in Zambia. [ONLINE] Available from:
http://www.plaas.org.za/blog/strengthening-land-rights-zambia (accessed
15.04.16.).
Hansungule, M., Feeney, P., Palmer, R.,1998. Report on Land Tenure Insecurity on the
Zambian Copperbelt. Oxfam GB, Zambia, Lusaka.
Harvey, D., 2003. The New Imperalism. Oxford University Press.
Hilson, G., Yakovleva, N., 2006. Strained relations: a critical assessment of the
mining conﬂict in Prestea, Ghana. In: Hilson, Gavin (Ed.), Small-Scale Mining,
Rural Subsistence and Poverty in West Africa. Intermediate Technology and
Development Group Publications, United Kingdom, pp. 241–251.
Hilson, G., 2002. An overview of land use conﬂicts in mining communities. Land Use
Policy 19, 65–73. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0264-8377(01)00043-6.
Hilson, G., 2009. Small-scale mining, poverty and economic development in sub-
Saharan Africa: an overview. Resour. Policy 34, 1–5. doi:http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.12.001.
Hilson, G., 2012. Corporate social responsibility in the extractive industries:
experiences from developing countries. Resour. Policy 37, 131–137. doi:http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2012.01.002.
Hilson, G., 2014. Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods:
Development Challenges in an Era of Globalization. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Hilson, G., 2016. Farming, small-scale mining and rural livelihoods in Sub-Saharan
Africa: a critical overview. Extr. Ind. Soc. 3, 547–563. doi:http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.exis.2016.02.003.Hinojosa, L., Bebbington, A., 2007. Struggles over territory and livelihood in
neoliberalized environments: transnational mining companies and civil-
society networks in the Andes. 3rd ESRC Seminar on Neoliberalism p. 24.
Hinojosa, L., 2013. Change in rural livelihoods in the Andes: do extractive industries
make any difference? Commun. Dev. J. 48, 421–436. doi:http://dx.doi.org/
10.1093/cdj/bst023.
Hopwood, J., 2015. Customary Land Public Authorities and the Reform Agenda: The
Background to Three Reports from Northern Uganda. [ONLINE] Available from:
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/2015/11/24/customary-land-public-authorities-and-
the-reform-agenda-the-background-to-three-reports-from-northern-uganda/.
IFAD, 2006. Land tenure security for poverty reduction in Eastern and Southern
Africa L.. Tenure Work, , pp. 27–29.
Kirsch, S., 2014. Mining Capitalism. University of California Press.
Kitula, A.G.N., 2006. The environmental and socio-economic impacts of mining on
local livelihoods in Tanzania: a case study of Geita District. J. Clean. Prod. 14,
405–414. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2004.01.012.
Kulindwa, K., Mashindano, O., Shechambo, F., Sosovele, H., 2003. Mining for
Sustainable Development in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam University Press, Dar es
Salaam.
Lange, S., 2008. Land Tenure and Mining in Tanzania. CMI-Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Livingstone, G., Schonberger, S., Delaney, S., 2011. Sub-Saharan Africa: the state of
smallholders in agriculture IFAD. Conference Paper on New Directions for
Smallholder Agriculture, January 2011, Rome, pp. 24–25.
Maconachie, R., Binns, T., 2007. ‘Farming miners’ or ‘mining farmers’? Diamond
mining and rural development in post-conﬂict Sierra Leone. J. Rural Stud. 23 (3),
367–380.
Maconachie, R., Hilson, G., 2016. Re-thinking the child labor problem in rural sub-
Saharan africa: the case of Sierra Leone’s half shovels. World Dev. 78, 136–147.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.012.
Maconachie, R., 2011. Re-agrarianising livelihoods in post-conﬂict Sierra Leone?
Mineral wealth and rural change in artisanal and small-scale mining
communities. J. Int. Dev. 23, 1054–1067. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1831.
Maconachie, R., 2014. Dispossession, exploitation or employment? Youth
livelihoods and extractive industry investment in Sierra Leone. Futures 32,
1441–1459.
Manji, A., 2006. The Politics of Land Reform in Africa: From Communal Tenure to
Free Markets. Zed Books.
Mcauslan, P., 2005. Legal Pluralism as a Policy Option: Is It Desirable, Is It Doable? .
Meinzen-Dick, R., Mwangi, E., 2009. Cutting the web of interests: pitfalls of
formalizing property rights. Land Use Policy 26 (1), 36–43.
Mitchell, J., 2013. Uranium Exploration in Tanzania: CCM Protects the Interests of
Foreign Investors Not Citizens [WWW Document]. URL https://
jamesmitchellmining.wordpress.com/2013/06/04/uranium-exploration-in-
tanzania-ccm-protects-the-interests-of-foreign-investors-not-citizens/
(accessed 02.16.15.).
The Munden Project, 2014. Global Capital Local Concessions. Retrieved March 12,
2014, from http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/ﬁles/doc_6301. pdf.
Noe, C., 2013. Contesting village land: uranium and sport hunting in Mbarang’andu
Wildlife Mangement. LDPI Working Paper, .
Oxfam America, 2014. Geographies of conﬂict. Global Capital, Local Concessions:
[WWW Document], 2013, URL http://www.rightsandresources.org/
documents/ﬁles/doc_6301.pdf (accessed 03.12.14.) Washington DC.
Oya, C., Cramer, C., Sender, J., 2008. Discretion and heterogeneity in mozambican
rural labour markets. In: de Brito, Luis, Castel-Branco, Carlos, Chichava, Sergio,
Francisco, Antonio (Eds.), Reﬂecting on Economic Questions, Maputo,
Mozambique: IESE, pp. 50–71.
Patel, K., Rogan, J., Cuba, N., Bebbington, A., 2016. Evaluating conﬂict surrounding
mineral extraction in Ghana: assessing the spatial interactions of large and
small-scale mining. Extr. Ind. Soc. 3, 450–463. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
exis.2016.01.006.
Payne, B.G., Durand-lasserve, A., Payne, G., 2012. Holding on: security of tenure –
types, policies. Pract. Chall. 1–78.
Payne, G., Mitchell, J., Kozumbo, L., English, C., Baldwin, R., 2015. Legitimate Land
Tenure and Property Rights: Fostering Compliance and Development Outcomes.
DAI, London.
Payne, G., 2004. Land tenure and property rights: an introduction. Habitat Int. 28,
167–179. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0197-3975(03)00066-3.
Peluso, N.L., Lund, C., 2011. New frontiers of land control: introduction. J. Peasant
Stud. 38, 667–681. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2011.607692.
Perreault, T., 2013. Dispossession by accumulation? Mining, water and the nature of
enclosure on the bolivian altiplano. Antipode 45, 1050–1069. doi:http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/anti.12005.
Peters, P.E., 2013. Conﬂicts over land and threats to customary tenure in Africa. Afr.
Aff. 112 (449), 543–562. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt047.
Rigg, J., 2006. Land farming, livelihoods and poverty: rethinking the links in the
rural south. World Dev. 34 (1), 180–202.
Schueler, V., Kuemmerle, T., Schröder, H., 2011. Impacts of surface gold mining on
land use systems in Western Ghana. Ambio 40, 528–539.
Shackleton, C.M., Shackleton, S.E., Cousins, B., 2001. The role of land-based strategies
in rural livelihoods: the contribution of arable production, animal husbandry
and natural resource harvesting in communal areas in South Africa. Dev. South.
Afr. 18, 581–604. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03768350120097441.
Shitima, E.M., 2005. Forest Conservation and People’s Livelihoods: Explaining
Encroachment On Zambia’s Protected Forest Landscapes – The Case of Mwekera
National Forest, Kitwe Copperbelt, MPhil Thesis. Norwegian University of
Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway.
J. Mitchell / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 1117–1129 1129Sikor, T., Lund, C., 2009. Access and property: a question of power and authority.
Dev. Change 40, 1–22. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j. 1467-7660.2009.01503.x.
Slack, K., 2013. The Growing Battle Between Mining and Agriculture. [ONLINE]
Available from: http://inec.usip.org/blog/2013/mar/29/growing-battle-
between-mining-and-agriculture (accessed 20.04.16.).
Stanﬁeld, D., Bloch, P., 2002. ‘USAID Investments in Land Markets and Property
Rights: Interim Assessment Based on Secondary Sources’ Land Tenure Center.
University of Wisconsin.
USAID, 2009. Land Tenure and Property Rights Assessment: the Northern Rangeland
and Coastal Conservation Programs of Usaid/Kenya. .
USAID, 2011a. USAID Issue Brief Land Titling and Credit Access – Understanding the
Reality. USAID ISSUE BRIEF.
USAID, 2011b. USAID Country Proﬁle: Property Rights and Resource Governance.
TANZANIA. [ONLINE] Available from: http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/
default/ﬁles/country-proﬁles/full-reports/
USAID_Land_Tenure_Tanzania_Proﬁle.pdf (accessed 26.04.16.).
USAID, 2016. Performance Evaluation of the Mobile Application to Secure Tenure
(MAST) Pilot. [ONLINE] Available from: http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/
default/ﬁles/USAID_Land_Tenure_MAST_Workshop_Performance_Evaluation.
pdf.
Varley, A., 2007. Gender and property formalization: conventional and alternative
approaches. World Dev. 35 (10), 1739–1753 Peer Reviewed Journal.Verbrugge, B., Cuvelier, J., Van Bockstael, S., 2015. Min(d)ing the land: the
relationship between artisanal and small-scale mining and surface land
arrangements in the Southern Philippines, Eastern DRC and Liberia. J. Rural
Stud. 37 (1), 50–60.
Wanyeki, L., 2003. Women and Land in Africa: Culture, Religion and Realizing
Women’s Right’s. Zed Books.
Weizman, E., 2002. The Politics of Verticality. . This is a sequence of 11 short pieces e
references are to chapter http://www.opendemocracy.net/ecology-
politicsverticality/article_801.jsp.
Weizman, E., 2007. Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. Verso, London.
World Bank, 2016. Extractive Industries Home: Overview. [ONLINE] Available from:
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview#1
(accessed 20.04.16.).
Further reading
Forest Peoples Programme, Free, Prior and Informed Consent 2016. [ONLINE]
Available from: http://www.forestpeoples.org/guiding-principles/free-prior-
and-informed-consent-fpic (accessed 20.04.16.).
